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Abstract
Online labor platforms, such as the Amazon Mechanical
Turk, provide an effective framework for eliciting responses
to judgment tasks. Previous work has shown that workers re-
spond best to financial incentives, especially to extra bonuses.
However, most of the tested incentives involve describing the
bonus conditions in formulas instead of plain English. We be-
lieve that different incentives given in English (or in quali-
tative framing) will result in differences in workers’ perfor-
mance, especially when task difficulties vary. In this paper,
we report the preliminary results of a crowdsourcing exper-
iment comparing workers’ performance using only qualita-
tive framings of financial incentives. Our results demonstrate
a significant increase in workers’ performance using a spe-
cific well-formulated qualitative framing inspired by the Peer
Truth Serum. This positive effect is observed only when the
difficulty of the task is high, while when the task is easy there
is no difference of which incentives to use.
Introduction
In online labor markets, the quality of the answers returned
by inexpert, remote workers presents an important concern
for the usefulness of such crowdsourcing process. The stan-
dard techniques for quality assurance, such as combining an-
swers from different workers and posterior removal of non-
satisfactory answers (Ipeirotis, Provost, and Wang 2010),
assume the existence of a correct answer. Yet, for judg-
ment tasks—tasks involving human subjective judgment
such as collecting opinions, preferences, relevance estima-
tions, ratings, or emotion categorization—it is difficult to
establish the validity of a specific answer based only on
the (dis)agreement with the majority label.
Previous research showed the potential of motivat-
ing workers by introducing additional incentives, such as
bonuses for good-quality answers (Ho et al. 2015; Harris
2011). Yet, these works require automatic estimation of the
answers’ correctness. The schemas without this requirement
would be preferable for judgment tasks. In this direction,
other works suggest that giving bonus based on the consis-
tency with peer answers is most advantageous (Shaw, Hor-
ton, and Chen 2011; Huang and Fu 2013; Faltings et al.
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2014). Such peer-oriented schemas originate from a game-
theoretic approach to incentivize truthful answers (Prelec
2004), and thus they imply the mathematical formulation
of bonus computation. However, a lay person from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is unlikely to fully understand the
implications of such computations, especially in case of non-
mathematical judgment tasks (such as emotion labeling). To
overcome this, we suggest to study alternative simplified for-
mulations of the peer-oriented schemas suitable for applica-
tion in judgment tasks without any mathematical formulas.
We refer to this approach as qualitative framing. We report
in this paper the results of a crowdsourcing experiment con-
ducted on the MTurk, where we compare several qualita-
tively framed peer-oriented incentives with the ones inspired
by previous research on social incentives in crowdsourcing
(Shaw, Horton, and Chen 2011) across two difficulty levels
in the context of emotion annotation.
Experiment Design
We use in our experiment a specific judgment task—
annotating emotions in tweets. We ask each worker to label
10 tweets after completing a mandatory tutorial. For each
tweet, the worker should indicate the dominant emotion felt
by the author while writing the tweet by selecting one of 20
emotion categories, No emotion, or Other emotion from the
Geneva Emotion Wheel (GEW, version 2.0) (Scherer et al.
2013). For example, for the tweet “Woooo! It’s a good day”,
the worker is likely to select the emotion Happiness. The
worker is also asked to provide the excerpts of the tweet in-
dicating the presence of the chosen emotion (“Woooo” and
“good day” in the example) as well as additional emotion
indicators (not from the tweet text). The same task was pre-
sented and studied in our previous work (Sintsova, Musat,
and Pu 2013). We also included optional demographic and
feedback questionnaires. For the sake of brevity, we report
here only the results for the emotion labels.
We randomly assigned each worker to an incentive treat-
ment condition employing a specific bonus formulation. To
discover whether the effects of incentives differ depending
on the difficulty of the annotation, we assigned workers at
random to one of two difficulty levels.
The base payment was set to $0.5 USD, and there was
information about a chance to obtain an additional bonus of
$0.1 USD. A specific description of the bonus (dependent on
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the assigned incentive condition) was presented to a worker
right before starting the tweets’ annotation:
“You can qualify for the additional $0.1 bonus if your an-
swers [...]”
Normative: “... demonstrate an additional effort.”
Experts: “... are extremely accurate according to our ex-
perts.”
Professors: “... are approved by our professors.”
Peer Agreement: “... agree with those of other workers.”
Peer Truth Serum 1 (PTS1): “... are more surprisingly
common with other workers than collectively predicted.”
Peer Truth Serum 2 (PTS2): “... both agree with those of
other workers and at the same time novel.”
The second variable was the difficulty of the tweets to label:
Easy dataset The first, “easy” dataset consisted of 70 tweets
manually chosen such that they were explicitly emotional
and not difficult to interpret, judged by us as requiring less
effort to annotate. The example tweet is “You said it would
be different but like usual nothing has changed”.
Difficult dataset The second, “difficult” dataset comported
70 emotional tweets that were less obvious to interpret and
believed to require more attention to annotate, because they
contained negated emotional terms, or were of a sarcastic na-
ture, or simply confusing. The example tweets are “I do not
regret a single thing being born as Dusun.” and “Best part
about rush hour is driving into it going Chicago!!! #not”.
Results
We ran the experiment on MTurk between May 13th and
June 3rd 2015, with 1, 135 workers completing the full task.
The random assignment of workers to treatment conditions
resulted in a fairly even split of the non-spamming workers
across all conditions (94.6± 3.2 workers per group).
We estimate agreement and correctness of the returned
emotion labels to evaluate the workers’ performance. We
report average per-worker scores. The computation of each
metric for one worker’s answer on a tweet is as follows.
Category agreement of a worker’s emotion category label
is computed as the percentage of agreed peer labels for the
same tweet. To compute category correctness, we first ob-
tain the ground-truth categories by aggregating the workers’
labels from all incentive conditions. For each tweet, we ex-
tract the majority label and all the categories with a relatively
high assignment number (we use the threshold of 0.5 mini-
mum ratio from the majority label count). The worker’s label
is considered to be correct if it is within the set of extracted
ground-truth labels for the tweet.
Because the two-way ANOVA revealed a significant in-
teraction between the two studied factors, we decided to re-
sort on analyzing the simple effects of incentives at each
level of difficulty. We found no significant effect of the in-
centives’ framing on the quality of emotion labels on the
easy dataset (p-value of one-way ANOVA is 0.183 for cat-
egory agreement and 0.571 for category correctness on the
easy dataset). Nevertheless, the incentives significantly af-
fect worker’s performance on the difficult dataset Indeed, p-
value of one-way ANOVA is < 10−7 for category agreement
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Figure 1: The effect of incentives on average category agree-
ment of workers assigned to the difficult dataset. Error bars
indicate a standard error.
and 0.033 for category correctness. Figure 1 visualizes the
differences in category agreement between incentives’ con-
ditions on the difficult dataset. Pairwise comparison of the
incentives reveals the advantage of PTS2 incentive on the
difficult dataset: it is significantly better than any other in-
centive in terms of category agreement (the highest p-value
is 0.045 when comparing with PTS1), and it leads to the
highest category correctness while significantly outperform-
ing the Normative condition (with p-value = 0.023). The
Normative condition, which is appealing only to workers’
honesty, in its turn results in the lowest category agreement
on the difficult dataset, significantly different from PTS1,
PTS2, and Professors incentives (with p-values ≤ 0.034).
The workers’ answers to the feedback questionnaire ver-
ify that the difficult dataset is indeed perceived as more diffi-
cult than the easy dataset and that it requires additional cog-
nitive effort to label. This implicitly approves our method-
ology for selecting tweets for the difficult and easy datasets.
The further statistical analysis revealed no effect of the in-
centives’ framing on the workers’ perceived task compre-
hension, enjoyment, easiness, or cognitive effort.
Discussion
The results of our experiment revealed the differences in the
effects of the incentives’ framing depending on the difficulty
of the emotion annotation task. When the task is easy, no in-
centive results in significantly improved performance com-
pared to the other incentives. However, when difficulty of the
task increases, our findings suggest that it is beneficial to use
a particular incentive: with a well-formulated version of the
Peer Truth Serum (PTS) bonus, workers tend to output more
correct and agreeing emotion labels. This finding is in accor-
dance with benefits of this schema in its mathematical for-
mulation for non-judgment tasks (Faltings et al. 2014). We
study two different qualitative formulations of the Peer Truth
Serum (“surprisingly common” vs. “agreeing and novel”)
and found that only the second formulation can lead to sig-
nificantly better answers showing the importance of better
qualitative framing of the incentives.
The fact that the qualitative framing of incentives affects
the quality of answers at least for one fixed bonus amount
encourages the future investigation, testing, and deployment
of more advantageous qualitative bonus formulations. Our
findings could be of potential value to the researchers and
practitioners aiming to design incentives mechanisms for
judgment tasks.
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